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Abstract 
In this paper the relationship is assessed between participation in microfinance program under 
SGSY scheme through forming Self-Help Group and getting employment through Mahatma 
Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Program (MGNREGP). Using Tobit Model 
with endogenous covariate method it is established that participation in microfinance program 
operating through joint liability credit contract help the rural households mainly the women to 
generate more social capital than the non-participant households which ultimately help them 
to get more information about different developmental program like MGNREGP initiated by 
the government. Hence, it came out from our investigation that microfinance participant 
member households get more number of man-days of employment through MGNREGP than 
the non-member households. It is also established from our investigation that households with 
higher average monthly income and less dependency ratio are less prone to demand job under 
MGNREGP.     
Key words: Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Program, Microfinance, 
Self-Help Group, Social Capital. 
JEL Classifications: C24, D83, G21, J21, P25.  
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LINKAGE BETWEEN MICROFINANCE PARTICIPATION AND 
SECURING EMPLOYMENT THROUGH MGNREGP 
1. Introduction: 
The National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (NREGA, 2005) which in October, 2009 
renamed as Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Programme 
(MGNREGP) is a significant social policy initiative particularly for the rural people in India. 
It is instituted by an Act of the Parliament and treats employment as a right which contains 
provisions such as minimum wages, worksite facilities and mandatory participation of female 
workers. This programme is based on Keynesian concept of direct job creation by the 
government in an economy where we see the presence of unemployment and 
underemployment particularly in the rural sector. Its main objective is to provide 
enhancement of livelihood security of the households in rural areas of the country by 
providing at least 100 man-days of guaranteed wage employment at government decided 
wage rate to every household in unskilled manual work. Proper awareness of the local people 
about different aspects is necessary for proper implementation of this scheme. Shankar et.al. 
(2011) observed that a large majority of participant households did not properly know that 
they would receive additional wage if work was provided at a distance more than 5 km. or 
they are entitled to unemployment awareness if they were not provided with work within 15 
days. So here we hypothesize that the rural households will be more prone to join under 
MGNREGP if the household possess more information about different scheduled components 
of the program. The work under MGNREGP is measured in terms of number of full man days 
of getting employment under this scheme in particular accounting years. But the question is 
how the information about the program can be reached to the targeted level of rural people. 
Information about other people, about what they are doing and the potential to influence their 
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behavior, each represents different facet of social capital. So we can claim generation of 
Social Capital among the rural households may help them to get more detail information 
about this employment program.  
Social capital indicates connection with in the social network. The concept of social capital 
highlights the value of social relations and the role of co-operation and confidence to get 
economic results. It refers to the process between people which establishes network norms, 
social trust and co-operation for mutual benefits. Coleman (1988) has explained social capital 
as an asset which is generated among the people on group level which will help them to 
improve their knowledge in different aspects of life through interacting among the group 
members or with fellow villagers. It is actually close contract with friends, colleagues and 
fellow community members using which she can receive opportunities to use her physical as 
well as human capital. It can also be generated through interacting with organization like 
NGO or local panchayet or any development officer. Social capital of an individual is a non-
material enhancement of asset which can help her to get more information about different 
development programs taken by the government.  World Bank in 2009 have also considered 
social capital as one of the vital resources to bring out the desirable outcomes for any 
development program. Like physical or human capital, social capital needs maintenance. 
Social bonds have to be periodically renewed and reconfirmed. Joint liability microfinance 
system through forming Self-Help Group is a way through which social capital not only can 
be generated but also can be maintained.  
The joint liability micro-finance system is based on peer monitoring which actually plays the 
role of collateral during the disbursement of credit from the group. So in any Self-Help Group 
(SHG) we see the presence of trust among the group members: which entails a willingness to 
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take risks in a social context based on the sense of confidence that others will respond as 
expected and will act in mutually supportive way. We also see the presence of reciprocity 
among the group members when each group member acts as a benefit of other group 
members. Membership size is a crucial factor for generating social capital among the group 
members. Relatively small size permits closer ties among members and reduce costs of 
information within the group. Each SHG member has to present herself in the group meeting 
organized by the group she belongs which is happening at least twice in each month. This 
meeting encourages regular interaction among members of highly localized communities 
which was almost absent in rural communities particularly among the married women before 
group formation. It is also established that participation of a rural married woman in 
microfinance program through forming self-help group helps her to improve their intra-
household decision making power (Kundu, 2011). This enhancement of empowerment helps 
her to come out from the narrow corner of the house and participate in different gram shabhas 
organized by local panchayet. More and more interaction of the SHG members with fellow 
group members as well as local panchayet members help them to get much more information 
about different welfare programs organized by local panchayet. MGNREP is such a welfare 
program taken by Government of India through local Panchayet which can help the rural 
people to get non-farm employment in their locality. In our research investigation we consider 
the microfinance program under Swarnajayanti Gram Swarojgar Yojona (SGSY), which has 
initiated by the Central Government as a poverty alleviation program with the help of local 
panchayat and District Rural Development Agency (DRDA).  DRDA initiates and sustains the 
process of social mobilization for formation, development and strengthening of Self-Help 
Groups (SHG)s through facilitators which means the microfinance program is operating 
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through joint liability credit contract.  Generally a group consists of 10-15 members. It was 
directed by the government of India that the groups will be formed by taking members mainly 
from the households who belongs to Below Poverty Level (BPL) category. The members of 
the SHG under this microfinance program are almost homogeneous in nature and they belong 
to almost same socio-economic background (Kundu, 2008). 
The basic research objective of this paper is to investigate whether microfinance participation 
under SGSY scheme help the rural households to get comparatively more number of man-
days of employment under MGNREGP through generating Social Capital than the non-
participants. The paper is segregated in to different sections. In Section-2 we give a brief 
overview of literature. In Section-3 we shall discuss about the sample design and 
methodology used to investigate the above mentioned research problem. In Section-4 we shall 
mention the results of the main econometric exercise and in Section-5 we want to give the 
economic interpretation of the results and then we draw concluding observations of our paper.   
Section-2 : Overview of Literatures. 
Udry(1994) had shown that the information flows and close-knit relationship with in 
traditional society could overcome information asymmetries in credit market. Bardhan 
et.al.(2008) examined the relationship between political participation and its relation to local 
governance. They found that allocation of benefits across villages by local government 
displayed bias against poor and low-caste groups. These biases were larger in villages with 
more unequal land ownership and lower participation rate in the village meeting. Actually 
information always plays an important role for proper public service delivery. Pandey et.al. 
(2008) had observed that community based information campaigns in India were shown to 
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have improved school presence at least in the short run. Kundu (2011) had proved that two 
public policies SGSY and NREGS can jointly bring happiness among the rural participants. 
 Mayoux (2001) first observed that due to multidimensional aspects microfinance program 
under the joint liability system is effective enough to generate social capital among the rural 
women in the under developed countries. Actually microfinance helps building social capital 
to enhance degree of information sharing, democratic participation, collective decision 
making and sustainable development. Sustainable development requires combination of 
natural capital, physical capital and human capital. Microfinance program makes use of 
existing social capital in the society and link that to physical capital for faster economic 
growth. Microfinance participation helps in bringing wide political participation stronger 
interventions in decision making process and more bargaining position for poor women. 
Oksan (2008) had shown how microfinance participation can contribute to the political 
awareness and social activism through the process of development of social capital.  
Basangekar (2010) established that microfinance program implementation has created a social 
capital which has an empowering effect on SHG members.  Shankar, Gaiha and Jha (2011) 
had shown that information can enhance the ability of the rural people particularly the acutely 
poor to get benefit from the scheme. They had shown that mainly the non-poor get the benefit 
of NREGA due to getting better information about the program than the acutely poor who had 
hardly attend public meetings and were not connected to social network properly. According 
to them social network as well as access to information increased the likelihood of 
participation of the affluent but decreased the likelihood of participation by the non-affluent 
and the poor. Again there should be a strong link between participation in microfinance 
through forming SHG and generation of social capital among the group members. So we can 
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claim that social connectivity can be enhanced through the participation of microfinance 
program under SGSY scheme which is to be operated with the help of local government like 
District Rural Development Agency (DRDA) run by the local panchayet. But no one has 
properly investigated to identify whether there is any link between two public policies 
initiated by Indian government to alleviate poverty?    
Section-3: Sample Design and Methodology: 
We initially have chosen three gram panchayets Gabberia, Ghateswar and Krishnapur of 
Mandirbazar block and two gram panchayets  Dakhin Raipur and Digambarpur of Pathar 
Pratima block of South 24 Parganas district, (an economically backward district of West 
Bengal) as sample blocks and panchayets all of which are economically backward. From each 
panchayet, we have randomly chosen one village. Then we have to identify the Self-Help 
Groups under SGSY scheme in those sample villages which have formed between April to 
July 2007 because that time period is here considered as base line period (identified as t1
th
 
period) in our investigation. The information about the time of formation of SHGs during that 
particular time period was collected from local panchayet offices. We have altogether found 
33 such groups (19 of Pathar Pratima block and 14 of Mandir Bazar block). From each group 
we have chosen 7 members (from one group we have chosen 8 members) randomly. So total 
sample size of SHG members under SGSY scheme became 232. During the time of finalizing 
sample belongs to control group we have chosen the married village women from almost 
identical socio-economic background who had not yet joined in any SHG even at the end line 
time period i.e. at September-December 2009 (indicated as t2
th
 time period) from the same 
villages under same blocks. So total time span in our investigation is two and half years (from 
April-July, 2007 to September-December, 2009)  
8 
 
Total sample size of the respondents belongs to control group after scrutinizing their 
responses became 156. Actually the end line survey was designed to cover the same 
respondents both members and non-members who had been covered in the baseline. So we 
have longitudinal data of two periods of each respondent both belongs to treatment group as 
well as control group. Comparison between the baseline and end-line data revealed possible 
changes in getting job through MGNEGP of both the participants as well as non-participant 
households.  
In our investigation we have to find out the factors which can influence a rural household to 
demand as well as get more jobs through MGNEGP between the experimental time periods 
and to do that we have to consider the following linear equation: 
 
In the above equation  is average number of full man-days the i
th
 household (either 
belongs to treatment group or belongs to control group) get job annually under MGNREGP 
between the t1
th
 time period and t2
th
 time period. Initially we have asked each respondent 
about total number of full man-days that respondent household has got job under NREGA 
between April-July 2007 to March 2008, April-2008 to March 2009 and from April 2009 to 
September-December 2009. Adding that, we have divided it by 2.5 to get ANREGA.  
VASSETt1 mainly includes the value of land owned by the i
th
 household in the t1
th
 time 
period. The value of land is expressed here as the then market value. Landlessness is often 
treated as an important indicator of poverty. In West Bengal most of the farmers are marginal 
in nature. Same picture is also observed in South 24 Pargana District where most of the 
farmers cultivate paddy in the rainy season mainly for self-consumption. If the land is fertile 
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and at least few minor irrigation facilities are there then the farmer household will obviously 
concentrate to cultivate different horticultural products. So it is possible that the ownership of 
fertile land with good market value can discourage the rural household to get job under 
MGNREGP because they have alternative sources of income. There are few differences in the 
value of land per bigha in Patharpratima block if we compare that with Mandirbazar block. 
Again the same block the value of land differs because of its fertility. The market value per 
bigha of land is more if it is more fertile. During the time of field investigation it was 
observed that the value of land in the sample villages of Patharpratima Block was around 
Rs.45000 per bigha i.e. one third of acre in base line period in our investigation but that price 
had increased up to Rs.55,000 to Rs.60,000 per bigha in the end line period. In the sample 
villages of Mandir Bazar block that prices were around      Rs.50,000 per bigha in the base 
line period and Rs.60,000 to Rs.70,000 per bigha during the end line period.  
Apart from land, VASSETt1 also accommodates the then market value of the shop if the 
respondent owns, the market value of ornaments and even consumer durables like cycles. 
Actually VASSETt1 is the aggregate of the market values of different types of assets owned 
by the respondent households which they can sell in their distress and higher value of it 
indicates economic solvency of the respondent household in the baseline period.    
MINCOMEit1 indicates the average monthly income of the sample household in the t1
th
 period 
considering the previous one year as reference year. We have also checked the correlation 
coefficient of VASSETt1 and MINCOMEt1 and the value of it is 0.10. So we can rule out the 
possibility of Multi-co linearity in the above equation.    
In MICOME we accommodate average monthly earnings from land and average (total) 
monthly wage income of the earning member(s) of the household both from farm and 
10 
 
nonfarm sector. This has to be considered because most of the sample households in our 
investigation are either landless or marginal farmer (who owns not more than 2.5 acres of 
land) and for livelihood they have to depend on multiple occupations. Though in India the 
poverty line is expressed in terms of Adult Equivalent Monthly Per-capita Consumption 
expenditure (MPCE), but it is difficult for a rural decision maker to calculate MPCE whereas 
she has almost clear idea about the average monthly income of the household she belongs. 
Hence, during the time of demanding job under MGNREGP, we consider MINCOME of the 
respondent household at the base line period as an explanatory control variable.   
DRATIOit1 indicates the dependency ratio of the i
th
 household in the t1
th
 period where,     
    DRatioi =  
Dependency ratio is calculated on the basis of Adult Equivalent Scale. Following Townsend 
(1994) to get adult equivalent family members we have considered 1 for any adult member 
(both male and female), 0.25 for any member of that household up to six years of age and 0.5 
for any member of the household between six and fourteen years of age and 0.75 between 
fourteen and eighteen years of age. 
Higher dependency ratio indicates comparatively less number of earning members of the 
household. It can be expected that a rural household with larger dependency ratio may 
become more prone to demand job under MGNREGP. 
EDULEVEL indicates the education level of the head of the family of the respondent 
household which is expressed here in terms of number of years of schooling. If (s)he is more 
educated then it is expected that (s)he should be much more aware about different 
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governmental development programmes like MGNREGP. All the above explanatory variables 
here treated as control variables. 
  indicates  = the mean value of social capital index of 
the i
th
 individual of the base line period and the „end line‟ period. The method of calculating 
the Index is mentioned in the Appendix. This is the most important explanatory variable in 
our investigation. As the time gap between the base line period and the end line period is two 
and half years, it was quite difficult for the investigator to calculate social capital index of 
each individual in each year. So we have taken the value of the index of each respondent 
household only for the baseline period and for the end line period and then consider the mean 
value of the index as an explanatory variable in our investigation. Kundu (2012) have shown 
that the enhancement of the value of Social Capital Index is more among the SGSY 
participants than the non-participants. So it is expected that the mean value of the Social 
Capita Index is more among the SGSY participants than the non-participants and this higher 
mean value may help the member households to get more number of full man-days of 
employment through MGNREGP. In equation (1) we consider as endogenous 
explanatory variable which is correlated with ui and the instrument of    which is 
not correlated with ui is SGSY as an instrumental variable. If a female member of the 
respondent household has joined microfinance programme under SGSY scheme in the 
baseline period through forming SHG and became member up to end line period then  SGSY 
= 1 otherwise it is considered as 0. 
So we have the following equation.  
 
The Regression result is   
                                                        (.245)   (.339)       
                                      Here              
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The statistical significance of establishes the fact that SGSY participation has a strong 
positive influence on the change of the value of her social capital index. So we can consider 
SGSY as an instrumental variable of and it is considered as uncorrelated with ui.  
Now from our sample observations we observe that for some individual households both 
belong to treatment group as well as control group    . It came out from our 
field survey that out of 388 sample households, 140 households mainly belong to control 
group who did not get any employment through this scheme. Again out of 140 households, 
133 households did not apply for job card even at the end-line period. Ignorance and lack of 
interest about the programme are the major causes behind that. This mainly happens of the 
sample households belong to control group. So in some cases the value of the explained 
variable in our regression is censored. If we assume that the disturbance term ui is normally 
distributed then we can apply Tobit regression in equation (1) considering   as 
endogenous explanatory variable where SGSY is treated as instrumental variable of 
    
Section-4: Results 
Before showing the regression result of Equation (1) we first mention the summary statistics 
of few important explanatory as well as explained variables all of which are given in Table-1.  
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Table-1 : Summary Statistics of the Explanatory Variables  and Explained Variables 
Name of the 
Variable 
SGSY Members Non SGSY Members 
Mean Median  S.D. Mean Median S.D. 
NREGAt1 (just 
before the base 
line period) 
.061 0 2.86 .053 0 3.29 
NREGAt2       
(within the 
experimental 
period) 
22.31 20 19.23 16.21 15 12.26 
VASSETt1(Rs.) 43773.19 0 73519.78 65263.123 50000 1357.88 
MINCOMEt1(Rs.) 1717.61 1804.35 691.57 1935.26 1700 1328.52 
SCAPITALt1 5.75 6 3.92 6.23 7 2.87 
SCAPITALt2 10.42 10 3.65 8.04 8 2.70 
Source: Calculated on the basis of data collected from field survey 
From Table-1 it is clear that just before the baseline period (considering previous one year as 
reference year) very few rural households got job under MGNREGP in both the sample 
blocks. Lack of availability of fund to initiate the programme was the major cause of it.  But 
within the experimental time period the SGSY member households got more number of full 
man-days job under MGNREGP on an average if we compare that to non member 
households. The expansion of MGNREGP among the households in the sample villages is not 
satisfactory. Low programme coverage among the needy rural households is the major reason 
behind low value of ANREGA.  
It is also observed that the mean value of Social Capital index among the respondents belongs 
to SHG members under SGSY scheme is more than the nonmembers in the end line period.    
Now the regression result of the Tobit model with endogenous covariate mentioned in Eq.(1) 
is shown in the Table-2. 
 
 
14 
 
Table-2: Regression result of Tobit Model with Endogenous Covariate: 
Name of the Explanatory Variable Values of the Marginal Coefficients 
VASSET .0011 (.00078) 
MINCOME -.3500* (.1010) 
DRATIO 253.18** (111.78) 
 450.391* (68.861) 
EDULEVEL -60.283** (27.892) 
Source: Regressed on the basis of data collected from field survey 
 Number of observations = 388, Uncensored observation = 248 and Left censored observation 
with  is 140. The value of Wald * which establishes goodness 
of fit of the above model and can conclude that the covariates used in the regression model are 
appropriate. The value of the Wald test of exogeneity of the instrumental variable gives (alpha 
=0): * which establishes the presence of endogeneity in at least one covariate 
in our model. So the point estimates of the Tobit model with endogenous covariate are 
consistent   
Here *=> Significant at 1% level and **=> Significant at 5% level. 
Section-5: Discussions: 
It came out from field investigation that the regularity of the SHG members to attain meetings 
of gram shabhas and interaction with local panchayet office has improved within the 
experimental time period. Enhancement of empowerment due to participation in microfinance 
programme is one of the major causes behind that. Actually different development 
programmes initiated by the government is generally circulated at public meeting like gram 
shabha. Regular attendance of such meeting implies the presence of network externalities 
which enhances social capital among the microfinance participants more than the 
nonparticipants. We know that there is a strong positive correlation between social capital and 
social empowerment. The social empowerment help the SHG members to enhance their 
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knowledge about different government programme like MGNREGP due to which they can 
demand more job under the scheme from local panchayet because they can now meet and 
interact more with government officials and know the procedure of demanding job through 
MGNREGP. As there is no excess demand in getting job under MGNREGP in the sample 
villages in both the blocks, we can say that enhancement of social capital due to participation 
in microfinance programme under SGSY scheme help the SHG member households to get job 
in terms of more number of days through MGNREGP than the non-participant households.    
 It is proved that the household with more average monthly income in the base line period is 
less interested to demand job under MGNREGP which proves that comparatively 
economically solvent households are less prone to demand job under MGNREGP.  
It is also proved that a household with larger the dependency ratio is more prone to demand 
job under MGNREGP. Larger dependency ratio of a household reflects poverty of that 
household when poverty line is calculated in terms of adult equivalence monthly per-capita 
consumption expenditure   
More educated the respondent, less will be her interest to enroll herself and her other family 
members to get job under MGNREGP.    
But ownership of land or any other asset (which is represented as VASSETt1), does not play 
any significant role during the time of taking decision about demanding job under 
MGNREGP. This also establishes the presence of economic homogeneity in terms of the 
value of assets owned between the member households belong to treatment group and control 
group in the base line period.   
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Conclusions: 
Most of the rural workers in India are unskilled and have little employment opportunities 
particularly in their own locality. MGNREGP is important for them because it can provide 
employment opportunity for those workers in their own village. Now to get proper 
information about this public policy, social capital always plays an important role. More 
social capital can be generated among the villagers through participating microfinance 
program under SGSY scheme and this enhancement of social capital help the member rural 
households to get more information about this public policy as well as more number of days 
of job through MGNREGP than the non-participant of SGSY households.   
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Appendix-1 
Method of Calculating Social Capital Index (asked either to the member or married non-
member women respondent both for „baseline‟ and „end line‟ period)1  
Name of the Variable Points 
1. Interaction with co-group 
members/neighbors outside the meeting 
Frequent-2, Normal-1 , Nominal - 0  
2. Your trust on co-group 
member/neighbor  
High-2, Normal-1, Not Impressive-0 
3. Are you supportive with your co-group 
members if she fails to repay her loan 
with in stipulated time period? 
Always -2, It Depends – 1,  No-0 
4. Awareness on child education, 
vaccination and other family health 
related matters through interacting with 
your co-group members or other fellow 
village women  
Good-2, Nominal -1, Nil-0 
5. Can she participate in different gram 
sabhas according to her will? 
Always-4, Not so often – 2 , No-0 
6. Interaction with SHG members or other 
villagers help you to get information 
about different financial and family 
matters 
Good-2 , Normal-1, Nil-0  
7. Can you go outside without taking 
permission from her husband  
Always-2, Sometimes-1, Never-0 
8. Can you cast your vote according to 
your will? 
Yes-2, No-0 
9. Decision on Family Planning  Respondent-2, Both-1, Husband-0 
The method of calculating Social Capital Index is constructed by the author himself. 
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